Traditionally logic was considered as having two branches: deductive and inductive. However the development of the subject from Frege (1879) up to about 1970 brought about a divergence between deductive and inductive logic. It is argued in this paper that developments in arti cial intelligence in the last twenty or so years (particularly logic programming and machine learning) have created a new framework for logic in which deductive and inductive logic can, once again, be treated as similar branches of the same discipline.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore some consequences for the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of science of advances in arti cial intelligence (AI) made in the last twenty or so years. Let me begin by listing some of these advances. I will describe the philosophically relevant aspects of these developments in more detail later. As far as the philosophy of logic is concerned, I must obviously begin by mentioning the development of the logic programming system PROLOG. This uses Robinson's resolution principle which had been developed in connection with investigations into automated theorem proving in the 1960's. The classic paper is Robinson 1965] . However the development of PROLOG itself occurred in the 1970's with the work of Colmerauer, Kowalski and others, cf. Colmerauer 1973] , and Kowalski 1974] , 1979a], and 1979b]. The title of Kowalski 1974] :`Predicate logic as a programminglanguage' gives one of the central ideas which underlay PROLOG. Yet, and this is a point which I will expand later, although PROLOG developed using classical predicate logic, it was destined to lead to a new kind of logic, the so-called non-monotonic logic. At rst indeed PROLOG appeared simply to use classical predicate logic, but soon it came to be realised that PROLOG's negation, the so-called negation-as-failure (cf. Clark 1978] ), was di erent from classical negation, and that this had given PROLOG a non-monotonic character. In classical logic, if a conclusion follows from a set of premisses, and we add one or more new premisses to the set, then the conclusion still follows. That gives classical logic its monotonic character. In PROLOG by contrast, the addition of new premisses may sometimes mean that a conclusion which had been drawn previously now no longer follows. This is the sense in which PROLOG is non-monotonic.
Of course PROLOG is by no means the only non-monotonic logic, and it is no coincidence that the development of PROLOG in the 1970's was followed by the 150 A Rapprochement Between Deductive and Inductive Logic study of a variety of systems of non-monotonic logic in the 1980's. Di erent systems of non-monotonic logic were proposed by McCarthy 1980] , McDermott and Doyle 1980] , and Reiter 1980] . These three papers all appeared in the same issue of the journal Arti cial Intelligence. Another interesting system was suggested by Nute in his 1986], while recently Gabbay has brought all these systems (and other nonclassical logics used in AI) into the general framework of what he calls: Labelled Deductive Systems, cf. Gabbay 1991] . Later in the paper, we shall consider what consequences these innovations have for the philosophy of logic, but next I want brie y to sketch another development in AI which has important philosophical consequences. This is the branch of AI known as Machine Learning.
The aim of machine learning is to write programs which will enable a computer, when given data, and some background knowledge, to induce general rules which the data satisfy. The project is a modern version of the plan which Francis Bacon proposed in his Novum Organum of 1620 for mechanising the inductive inferences on which he thought that science should be based. The rst successful Machine Learning programs appeared in the 1980's, while in the last few years considerable advances have been made in the eld. The AQ11 inductive inference program of Michalski and Chilausky (see their 1980]) obtained classi cation rules for diseased soy-bean plants, which were found to be superior in accuracy to those produced by expert plant pathologists. In the mid-1980's, Quinlan's ID3 (see his 1986]) represented a step forward in the eld, while the early 1990's have seen signi cantly more powerful machine learning programs, such as Quinlan's FOIL (cf. his 1990]), Muggleton and Feng's GOLEM (cf. their 1992]), and, developed from FOIL, Dzeroski and Bratko's mFOIL (cf. their 1992]). GOLEM has succeeded in discovering a number of scienti c laws which were previously unknown, and appear to be correct. One area of application has been concerned with the problem of inferring protein secondary structure from primary sequence (cf. Muggleton, King, and Sternberg 1992]). These recent results show beyond doubt that mechanical inductive inferences are possible, and so have profound implications for the philosophy of science community, many of whose members (including the present author!) had thought that such mechanized induction was an impossibility.
The implications of advances in Machine Learning for Philosophy of Science are brie y discussed in my 1993], Section 3.5, 69{72. Part I of the book is concerned with the theme of Inductivism and its Critics, and the following historical argument is developed. Newton was a supporter of inductivism as a philosophy of science, and claimed to have obtained his laws of mechanics and gravitation by induction from the data. The success of Newtonian mechanics in the 17th and 18th centuries inclined scientists to accept inductivism. The replacement of Newtonian mechanics in some areas by Relativity and Quantum Mechanics led to criticisms of inductivism, principally by the two philosophers of science: Duhem and Popper; but now the wheel is turning again, and the new results in machine learning are leading to a revival of inductivism. While my 1993] book outlined these developments in general terms, in the present paper I want to examine the issue in rather more detail, and, in particular, to concentrate on its logical aspects, that is, on the question of whether an inductive logic is possible, and, if so, how it relates to deductive logic. As we shall see, this question brings in, not just machine learning, but also PROLOG, non-monotonic logic, and labelled deductive systems.
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The main thesis of the paper can now be stated as follows. In the period from Frege 1879] to the 1970's, deductive logic and inductive tended to diverge, and to become two disciplines widely di ering in character. The e ect of the advances in AI just listed, so I will argue, ought to be to broaden our conception of both deductive and inductive logic. It turns out that these broader conceptions are more similar than were the narrower conceptions, so that a rapprochement between deductive and inductive logic may become possible. Such then is the general plan of the paper, and I will begin in the next section by describing the divergence between deductive and inductive logic which occurred in the period from Frege 1879] to the 1970's. 2 The divergence between deductive and inductive logic (up to 1970's)
The development of deductive logic from the time of Frege has seen an increasing emphasis on rules of inference. In Frege's original axiomatic deductive approach to logic, the need for rules of inference such as modus ponens: A A ! B B was indeed recognized. However the work of Gentzen in the 1930's eliminated axioms altogether in favour of rules of inference. This approach has seemed more natural to most logicians -hence the term natural deduction. The idea is that logic consists essentially of deducing conclusions from premisses. This is expressed in a natural way by rules of inference, while the introduction of axioms is an arti cial device. A good exposition of logic from this point of view is Tennant's 1978] book, entitled Natural Logic. The same approach can be applied to intuitionistic, as well as to standard (classical) logic. To sum up then: there has been an increasing tendency to see deductive logic as consisting of rules of inference. In contrast to this, as I will next argue, rules of inference have been almost entirely eliminated from inductive logic.
Let us begin by considering the traditional conception of deductive and inductive logic. Deductive logic was thought to consist of inferences such as Therefore
All Men are Mortal Socrates is a Man
Socrates is Mortal Inductive logic was also thought to consist of inferences, with the di erence that these proceeded from a rather inde nite mass of particulars to a general conclusion e.g. This conception was di cult to maintain in the face of Hume's critique of induction, since as Hume pointed out, the premisses of the inference could all be true, but the conclusion false. An obvious response to Hume was that although the conclusions of inductive inferences were not certain, they were nonetheless probable given the premisses. This approach has been developed by the Bayesian school, which actually originated in an attempt to answer Hume (cf. my 1987] for historical details). The development of Bayesianism, however, shifted the problem of inductive logic away from that of inferring inductive conclusions from factual premisses to that of calculating the probability of a hypothesis (h say) given some relevant evidence (e say). Research into inductive logic ceased to be an attempt to formulate rules of inductive inference, and became instead an attempt to nd ways of calculating P(h; e).
This tendency was reinforced by some further criticisms of induction due to Popper. The following passage is particularly notable (Popper, 1934 My own view is that the various di culties of inductive logic here sketched are insurmountable.' In the post-War period, particularly in the 1950's, there was a long running intellectual dispute between Carnap and Popper on issues connected with probability and induction. It is usually held that Carnap defended inductive logic, and tried to develop it, while Popper attacked inductive logic, and claimed that no such thing was possible. However, if we look at the controversy today, it seems (as so often happens when controversies are examined in retrospect) that the opponents had more in common than they perhaps realised at the time. The question whether an inductive logic with exact rules is at all possible is still controversial. But in one point the present opinions of most philosophers and scientists seem to agree, namely, that the inductive procedure is not, so to speak, a mechanical procedure prescribed by xed rules. If, for instance, a report of observational results is given, and we want to nd a hypothesis A Rapprochement Between Deductive and Inductive Logic 153 which is well con rmed and furnishes a good explanation for the events observed, then there is no set of xed rules which would lead us automatically to the best hypothesis or even to a good one. It is a matter of ingenuity and luck for the scientist to hit upon a suitable hypothesis;... . This point, the impossibility of an automatic inductive procedure, has been especially emphasized, among others by Karl Popper ... , who also quotes a statement by Einstein ... . The same point has sometimes been formulated by saying that it is not possible to construct an inductive machine. The latter is presumably meant as a mechanical contrivance which, when fed an observational report, would furnish a suitable hypothesis, just as a computing machine when supplied with two factors furnishes their product. I am completely in agreement that an inductive machine of this kind is not possible.' It is clear that Carnap says here is no longer plausible in the light of the recent advances in machine learning mentioned above. However, returning to the 1950's, we can see that Carnap (the defender of inductive logic), and Popper (the opponent of inductive logic) both agreed that it was futile to attempt to formulate rules of inductive inference. Moreover both Carnap and Popper attempted in the 1950's to develop con rmation theory, that is a theory which would enable a scientist to calculate (or at least estimate) the degree of con rmation which evidence e gave to a hypothesis h (in symbols C(h; e)). The di erence between the two philosophers only arises at this point, for Carnap was a Bayesian and held that C(h; e) obeyed the ordinary axioms of probability i.e. that it was a probability function, or in symbols that C(h; e) = P(h; e), whereas Popper was a critic of Bayesianism, and argued that C(h; e) did not satisfy the axioms of probability (was not a probability function). Although Popper did not think that C(h; e) was a probability function, he nonetheless held that it could be de ned in terms of probability. Thus, for both Carnap and Popper, inductive logic had become con rmation theory, a branch of study which was closely connected with probability theory, but had little to do with deductive logic.
To sum up then. By the early 1970's deductive logic was increasingly thought of almost exclusively in terms of rules of inference. By contrast those working in the eld of inductive logic had given up the hope of nding any rules of inductive inference, and were trying, using probability theory, to nd ways of estimating the degree to which evidence con rmed a hypothesis. This situation represents what is perhaps the maximum divergence between deductive and inductive logic. I will now try to show how the developments in AI between 1970 and the present have begun to bring the two elds together again. To do so, it will be convenient to introduce a framework which was obtained by modifying an idea of Kowalski's (cf. his 1979a & b]), and which is also quite closely related to Gabbay's conception of a labelled deductive system (cf. his 1991]). This is the task of the next section.
3 Logic = Inference + Control When developing his ideas about logic programming, Kowalski introduced the formula (which has subsequently become famous): Algorithm = Logic + Control (A = L + C) As he himself says (1979b, p. 125): Logic programs express only the logic component L of algorithms. The control component C is exercised by the program executor, either following its own autonomously determined control decisions or else following control instructions provided by the programmer.' I next want to propose a kind of extension of Kowalski's formula which I think will provide a useful framework for the discussions which follow. The new formula is Logic = Inference + Control (L = I + C) The picture is this. When we employ Logic, we start with a set of assumptions from which we want to derive some conclusions. To carry out these derivations we need a set of rules of inference (the Inference component). However in addition to these rules of inference, we will generally also need in practice some guidance as to which assumptions to choose, and which rules of inference to apply. This guidance constitutes the Control component. Thus the Control component might specify, at each stage of the derivation, which of the assumptions we should employ, and which of the rules of inference should be applied to these assumptions or to previously obtained results. More generally the Control component would be designed to help in the construction of a derivation or proof of a conclusion.
In terms of this new formula, we can explain the divergence between deductive and inductive logic which was discussed in the previous section. In the development of classical (and indeed intuitionistic) logic outside the AI eld, attention was largely devoted to the Inference component. The main problem was that of analysing the logic of mathematical proofs. It was implicitly assumed that these proofs would be constructed by human mathematicians so that not much attention need be paid to issues of control. As we have seen, philosophers of science studying inductive logic concentrated on con rmation theory, which, in terms of our new formula, is part of the Control component of inductive logic. Suppose we have a number of competing hypotheses. If we can attach con rmation values to these hypotheses, these values will help us to decide which hypothesis to choose for the purpose of making predictions, in practical applications etc. Clearly a hypothesis with higher con rmation is, in general, to be preferred to one with lower con rmation. As we remarked earlier, it is part of the function of the control component to help in the choice, at each stage of the derivation, of the assumptions to be used. While in the mathematical case, the Control needed in the construction of a proof was left to the human ingenuity of the mathematician; in the scienti c case, the Inference needed was left to the human ingenuity of the scientist. Thus in deductive logic (the logic of mathematical proof), inference was studied, while in inductive logic control was studied. AI altered this situation since it included: (i) the study of automated theorem proving, which led to the emergence of logic programming systems such as PROLOG, and (ii) the study of machine learning, which is, signi cantly, even now developing into the eld of inductive logic programming. As we shall see in Sections 4 and 5, the rst of these studies introduced control into deductive logic, while the second introduced inference into inductive logic. This is how the claimed rapprochement between deductive and inductive logic has become possible.
I will conclude this section by pointing out that the formula`Logic = Inference + Control' has strong links with Gabbay's conception of a Labelled Deductive System (cf. Gabbay, 1991) . In Gabbay's approach, each formula of the logic is labelled, and A Rapprochement Between Deductive and Inductive Logic 155 the rules of inference are augmented with rules of manipulation for the labels. Clearly the labels can be seen as adding a Control component. Indeed a recent interesting attempt to develop and evaluate logics for machine learning used con rmation values as labels within a Gabbay-style labelled deductive system (cf. Cussens, Hunter, and Srinivasan 1993]).
PROLOG introduces control into deductive logic
We have already remarked that PROLOG because of its negation-as-failure turned out to be a non-monotonic logic. We must next examine what is really a much more profound change { namely PROLOG's introduction of control into deductive logic. This can be illustrated by an analogy. The development of PROLOG (and indeed of formal logic in general) can be seen as a process of replacing craft skill by mechanisation. It is thus analogous to the change from hand-loom weaving to the power-loom, and similar industrial transformations.
In terms of this analogy, the Fregean revolution in logic (1879 { c. 1931) can be seen as the mechanisation of the process of checking a mathematical proof for validity. Before this revolution (and indeed for long after up to the present day), mathematical proofs were written out informally using natural language as well as symbolism. To check whether a proposed proof was indeed valid was no easy task, and had to be carried out by a trained mathematician, one of whose`craft skills' was that of checking whether a given line in a proof followed logically from what had gone before. Often disagreements occurred as to whether a proof was valid { though usually they were resolved after some discussion. Once a proof is written out in a formal language with all the logical steps fully explicit, the checking of the proof ceases to be a craft skill, and becomes a purely mechanical task which can be carried out by a computer.
It is interesting to note that Frege at times comes close to the above conception of what he is doing. Thus he writes in the preface to his Begri sschrift of 1879 (pp. 5{6):
To prevent anything intuitive Anschauliches] from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every e ort to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way I found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle; no matter how unwieldy the expressions I was ready to accept, I was less and less able, as the relations became more and more complex, to attain the precision that my purpose required. This de ciency led me to the idea of the present ideography. Its rst purpose, therefore, is to provide us with the most reliable test of the validity of a chain of inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries to sneak in unnoticed, so that its origin can be investigated.' Frege aims to eliminate`anything intuitive' from his proofs. He must here be referring to the intuitions of trained mathematicians, and these are part of what we have called their`craft skills'. To achieve this elimination of intuition, Frege tries to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps'. He nds it necessary to translate the expressions into a special formal language invented for the purpose (his Begri sschrift { literally`concept writing'), and he sees this procedure as providing us`with the most reliable test of validity of a chain of inferences'. In his implicit tendency towards a mechanisation of logic, Frege may have been inuenced by Jevons's earlier explicit adoption of the plan of mechanizing logic. Indeed Jevons actually had a logical machine constructed by a clockmaker in 1869. This device known as`Jevons's logical piano' does actually resemble a piano in appearance. By pressing the keys, the operator can input premisses, and cause a logical inference to be drawn mechanically. A picture of the logical piano appears as an illustration at the beginning of Jevons's 1874] The Principles of Science. This is one of the few contemporary works cited by Frege. Frege refers to an English edition of it in his 1884] in Section 16, p. 22, and on many subsequent occasions in the same work. 1 Classical (and indeed intuitionistic) logic can be seen as mechanising the process of checking the validity of a proof, but it leaves the construction of the proof entirely in the hands of the human mathematician who has to use his or her craft skills to carry out the task. PROLOG carries the mechanisation process one stage further by mechanising the construction of proofs. In this respect then it goes beyond classical logic.
Suppose we have a PROLOG database (including programs). If the user inputs a query e.g. ?-p(a). (i.e. is p(a) true?), PROLOG will automatically try to construct a proof of p(a) from the database. If it succeeds in proving p(a), the answer will be: yes', while, if it fails to prove p(a), the answer will be:`no'. In order to construct these proofs, PROLOG contains a set of instructions (often called the PROLOG interpreter) for searching systematically through various possibilities. The method is depth rst, left to right search. This means that the leftmost branch of the search space is explored until the tip of the tree is reached. The exploration the continues from left to right in the hope of nding a solution. If this leads to failure, backtracking occurs to a point, speci ed by the interpreter, from which the search starts again. The instructions for carrying out such searches are clearly part of a control system which has been added to the inference procedures of classical logic.
PROLOG is often referred to as a logic programming language. Thus Mueller and Page in their admirable 1988 textbook, say (Ch.33, p.291):`We have occasionally alluded to PROLOG as a logic programming language.' Now this turn of phrase has certainly something to commend it. The sentences of PROLOG are written in a language which is a variant of the language of the predicate calculus standardly used by logicians. Thus the sentence of ordinary language:`All swans are white' would be written:`(8x)(swan(x) ! white(x))' in predicate calculus, while in PROLOG, using Edinburgh-Syntax, it appears as: white(X) :-swan(X). The PROLOG sentence can be read as:`X is white, if X is a swan'. However, to speak of PROLOG as a logic programming language, is misleading if it suggests that PROLOG is just a formal language. In Fact PROLOG is more than just a language, and can be more correctly considered as a system of logic. This system contains not just a formal language, but also rules of inference, and an elaborate control mechanism designed to carry out searches and construct proofs. I will now describe two aspects of this control mechanism { explicit instructions such as the cut facility, and the importance of the order of the premisses. 2 Mueller and Page 1988] de ne a logic program as`a conjunction ... of a nite set of Horn clauses ...' Once again, although this de nition is not exactly wrong, it could be misleading, because it does not mention the essential element of control which is needed to make logic programs work. Often of course the control is exercised by the PROLOG interpreter, and so does not appear in the logic program itself, but sometimes the control element is explicitly written into the program. If this happens, the the logic program contains symbols which would not occur in the Horn clauses of ordinary classical logic. An example of this is the cut facility, written !. It will be remembered that the PROLOG interpreter when conducting its searches automatically backtracks in many situations. In some problems, however, we may not wish the program to carry out so much backtracking which could result in a waste of time, the provision of unnecessary solutions etc. The facility ! controls, in a precise though somewhat complicated way, the amount of backtracking which occurs. The details of how ! works need not concern us here. An account of the facility is given in Bratko 1986 ], Ch. 5, pp. 120{36. Bratko illustrates how ! functions by the following simple, but illuminating example (pp. 125{6).
Let us begin with a simple PROLOG 3 program for determining whether X is a member of the list L. This program, which we can call member.1, is the following:
member(X, X|L]). member(X, Y|L]) :-member(X,L).
If, when consulting this program, we make the following query:
?-member(X, a,b,c]).
PROLOG will answer
X=a; X=b; X=c; no Having used its search technique to nd one member of the list, a,b,c], namely a, PROLOG then backtracks to nd the next i.e. b, and so on until it has found all members of the list when it outputs:`no' to indicate that there are no further solutions. So far so good, but suppose we are interested in nding only one member of the list, viz. the rst member. All the backtracking to nd the remaining members of the list has become redundant, and can be eliminated using the cut facility ! by changing the program (member.1) to the following (member.2 say):
examples) by Cellucci in section 6 PROLOG AND THE ANALYTIC METHOD, pp. 24{9 of his 1993] Towards a New Logic. Cellucci's points of view in this paper is similar to the one in the present paper, but, at the same time, more general. Cellucci argues that traditional mathematical logic now needs to be replaced by computational logic. Mathematical logic is connected with the axiomatic method, while the new logic should be related to what he calls the analytic method. In the present paper I am attempting the more limited goal of creating a rapprochement between deductive and inductive logic. I believe that this more circumscribed task can be brought within Cellucci's more general framework of computational logic and the analytic method with which I nd myself in complete sympathy.If we repeat the preceding query using the program member.1 instead of the program member.2, we get the following result.
?-member(X, a,b,c]). X=a; no
In e ect the program member.2 nds the rst member of the list, but then does not backtrack to nd the other members.
If we compare the logic programs member.1 and member.2, we see that member.1 does indeed consist of a nite set of Horn clauses of 1st order predicate calculus. The only odd feature is that these are written in a slightly unusual way without using quanti ers etc. However this is a matter of terminology, and does not a ect anything of substance. By contrast the logic program member.2 contains the special symbol !, and neither this nor anything like it appears in the Horn clauses of classical 1st order predicate calculus. This is a simple but vivid and signi cant illustration of the way in which PROLOG adds to classical logic by introducing elements of control.
Another way in which PROLOG di ers from classical (or intuitionistic) logic concerns the order of the premisses. In classical (or intuitionistic) logic, the order in which the premisses are written down is of no importance, but this is not the case in PROLOG. Indeed PROLOG will draw quit di erent conclusions from the same premisses, if these are written down in a di erent order. Again we can illustrate this by a simple example. Consider the following logic program (which we can call`nonloop'):
If we make the query ?-p(a)., PROLOG will instantly answer:`yes'. The problem is hardly a very di cult one for PROLOG to solve. It has only to look at the rst line of the program, to nd out that p(a) is indeed true.
Suppose however we had written the two premisses in the opposite order to obtain the following logic program (`loop' say).
p(X) :-p(X). p(a).
If we made the same query ?-p(a)., there would be a long pause, after which a message such as`*** out of memory' would appear. To see what has gone wrong, let us consider how PROLOG would have tackled the same query if the rst line of the logic program had been p(X) :-q(X). On examining this line, PROLOG would have reasoned that could establish its goal of showing that p(a) if it could establish q(a). It would therefore have tried to establish q(a). In the case of the program loop', however, p = q, so that the program having started by trying to prove p(a), ends up by trying to prove p(a), and so gets into a loop. It thus invokes the rst line of the program over and over again without ever getting to the second line which contains the solution of the problem. This simple example shows that the order of the premisses is important because of PROLOG's control system for searching and constructing proofs.
It might be thought from the two preceding examples that in PROLOG one should never write down a clause of the form f:-f. In the logic program`nonloop' such A Rapprochement Between Deductive and Inductive Logic 159 an expression does no harm, but is not needed to answer the query; whereas in the logic program`loop', it is a clause of this form which causes the loop. It turns out, however, that there is a very useful facility called`repeat' which can be de ned by the following logic program.
repeat. repeat :-repeat.
(For technical reasons of speed and e ciency, repeat is usually de ned in a way di erent from the above program, but it behaves exactly as if it was de ned in the way just given.) The repeat facility is once again useful in connection with control. As a goal it always succeeds even on backtracking, and each time it is reached by backtracking it generates another alternative execution branch. It is thus useful for handling procedures which have to be carried out many times.
I will conclude this section by examining another di erence between PROLOG and classical (or intuitionistic) logic. This concerns not the question of control, but that of certainty. The inferences of classical (or intuitionistic) logic were designed to preserve certainty in the sense that if the premisses of the inference were certainly true, the conclusion had to be certainly true as well. PROLOG, however, will sometimes draw conclusions which might be false, even though the premisses are certainly true.
This di erence is connected with the subject-matter with which the logic was designed to deal. Frege and the other logicians who developed classical logic were concerned above all with the logic appropriate for proofs in the theory of numbers (natural numbers, rational numbers, and real and complex numbers). They thus, very reasonably, regarded the fundamental axioms of the theories with which they were dealing as certain, and hence tried to formulate rules of inference which preserved this certainty. Frege puts the matter quite clearly as follows ( 1884], Section 2, p. 2):
The aim of proof is ... to place the truth of a proposition beyond all doubt...' Let us contrast this with a typical situation in which PROLOG is employed. PRO-LOG is certainly not used for constructing proofs in formal arithmetic, or real number theory. Instead it might be used, for example, to construct a system for handling timetable enquiries. Suppose we have to deal with airline ights from a variety of places to a variety of destinations. All the timetable information about when ights depart, when they arrive, etc. can be coded and loaded on to the computer. We now want PROLOG, using this database, to answer queries such as:`what ights leave London for New York on a weekday afternoon ?' It is to answer this kind of query that PROLOG uses negation-as-failure. Suppose it wants to know whether there is a ight leaving London for New York on Wednesday afternoon. It will search through the list of ights leaving London on Wednesday afternoon,, and, if none of these ights go to New York, it will draw the conclusion that there is no ight leaving London for New York on Wednesday afternoon (negation-as-failure). Of course this conclusion might be false even if the information in the database is, per impossibile, certain beyond all reasonable doubt. It could be that, while all the information about ights in the database is correct, information about a ight leaving London for New York on Wednesday afternoon has just been omitted. Yet, although PRO-LOG's inference here is not certain (it would not satisfy Frege's rigorous criteria), it is highly reasonable, and would be drawn by anyone without a second thought. The key point here is that it would be futile and counter-productive to insist on employing only certainty-preserving rules of inference, if our premisses are themselves uncertain. While 5 + 7 = 12 can be regarded, to all intents and purposes, as certain, no one would regard the information in a timetable as certain. Some ights listed could have been cancelled, or have had their departure time altered, etc. If the timetable information is normally su ciently reliable to be used as the basis for planning journeys, but no one would regard it as certain. For handling such information, it is obviously appropriate to use a logic which draws reasonable conclusions, even if these are not entirely certain given the data. Thus PROLOG's negation-as-failure is very suitable for timetable (and similar) problems, but would be highly unsuitable for use in making deductions in formal number theory.
What emerges is the idea that there is not a single universal logic, but that di erent logics may be appropriate in di erent contexts or problem-situations.
Machine Learning introduces inference into inductive logic
Having examined the way in which logic programming has introduced control into deductive logic, let us now look at the other side, and see how machine learning has introduced rules of inference into inductive logic. To make things concrete we will brie y describe two successful recent machine learning algorithms, namely Quinlan's ID3 (cf. his 1986]), and Muggleton and Feng's GOLEM (cf. their 1992]).
Quinlan's ID3 is concerned to induce classi cation rules. Suppose we have a set of instances which are each described in terms of a number of attributes. We want to develop a rule which classi es these instances into P (positive) or N (negative) on the basis of the attributes. It is assumed that it can be recognised in an individual case whether the instance is P or N, and the problem is to nd a rule which agrees with these individual judgements.
In his 1986], Quinlan gives the following simple example to illustrate these general ideas. The instances here are Saturday mornings, and they are described by some weather attributes such as outlook, temperature, humidity, etc. The aim here is to nd a rule which classi es Saturday mornings into P (suitable for some unspeci ed activity), or N (unsuitable). In ID3, rules are given in the form of decision trees, of which the following (taken from Quinlan 1986 ], p. 87) is a simple example.
Quinlan describes the way such a decision tree is used for classi cation as follows ( 1986], pp. 86{7):
In order to classify an object, we start at the root of the tree, evaluate the test, and take the branch appropriate to the outcome. The process continues until a leaf is encountered, at which time the object is asserted to belong to the class named by the leaf.' Thus if a particular Saturday morning has a sunny outlook with normal humidity, we classify it, according to the decision tree in Fig. 1 , as P i.e. suitable for the activity in question.
Quinlan's ID3 has an algorithm for constructing a decision tree from some given data. His machine learning program then proceeds by iteration in a fashion which he describes as follows ( 1986] the window is chosen at random and a decision tree formed from it; this tree correctly classi es all objects in the window. All other objects in the training set are then classi ed using the tree. If the tree gives the correct answer for all these objects then it is correct for the entire training set and the process terminates. If not, a selection of the incorrectly classi ed objects is added to the window and the process continues. In this way, correct decision trees have been found after only a few iterations for training sets of up to thirty thousand objects described in terms of up to 50 attributes.' Quinlan's ID3 has had very considerable success in a wide range of applications, but, of course, there are limitations inherent in the method. The approach deals only with objects described by a set of one-place predicates, and induces only classi cation rules of the decision tree form. Now in many applications, the data are described using more of the rich resources of the predicate calculus, and similarly it is often desirable to induce rules which are formulated in predicate calculus terms which go beyond those involved in decision trees. Muggleton and Feng have accordingly developed a machine learning program called GOLEM (cf. their 1992]) which is based on quite di erent principles from those involved in ID3, and which, in particular, makes much greater use of the logical resources of the predicate calculus.
At the heart of GOLEM is a procedure for constructing what is known as the relative least general generalisation (or r.l.g.g.) of a number of examples. The concept of r.l.g.g. was introduced by Plotkin in his 1970 and 1971(a and b). Plotkin de nes a partial ordering of the generality of clauses. He then shows how to construct the least general (with respect to the ordering) generalisation of two clauses relative to some speci ed background knowledge. This is the r.l.g.g. However, Plotkin's r.l.g.g.'s could in the worst case contain in nitely many literals, and in general tended to grow exponentially with the number of examples involved. For these reasons the approach was abandoned until it was taken up by Muggleton and Feng. They managed to introduce restrictions which caused the resulting r.l.g.g.'s to be not just nite, but of a reasonable length. Using such r.l.g.g.'s it was possible to construct a machine learning program (GOLEM) operating according to the following iterative procedure.
GOLEM is provided with a set of positive examples, and a set of negative examples. It begins by taking a random sample of pairs of positive examples. It constructs the r.l.g.g. of each such pair. GOLEM takes each such r.l.g.g. and computes the number of examples which it could be used to predict. Clearly a given r.l.g.g. might predict some examples which are false. GOLEM therefore chooses the r.l.g.g. which predicts the most true examples while predicting less than a prede ned threshold of false examples. Having found the pair with the best r.l.g.g. (S say), GOLEM then takes a further random sample of the as yet unpredicted positive examples, and forms the r.l.g.g. of S and each of the members of this new random sample. These new r.l.g.g.'s are evaluated as before, and the process continues until no improvement in prediction is produced.
One problem with GOLEM as just described was that it sometimes produced rules which had too many variables for the number of examples they covered, and produced rules which`over-tted' noisy data. To avoid these problems Muggleton working with colleagues at the Turing Institute in Glasgow produced a measure of the degree to which an induced rule or hypothesis compressed the data from which it was derived (see Srinivasan, Muggleton and Bain 1992] ). Each hypothesis produced by GOLEM in the experimentation stage was checked by compression for signi cance. It is shown in Gillies 1992 ] that Muggleton's measure of compression is equivalent, in a certain sense, to the Turing-Good weight of evidence function. Thus GOLEM is in e ect using a con rmation measure to assess the hypotheses which it generates by an inductive algorithm. GOLEM has had very considerable success in inducing hitherto unknown laws in biochemistry, and in a variety of other applications.
Having given a brief sketch of the algorithms which underlie the successful machine learning systems ID3 and GOLEM, it should, I think, have become clear that these systems involve rules of inductive inference of a broadly logical character, which enable laws and generalisations to be inferred from data. It might still be objected that logical rules of inference should always lead to conclusions which are certain relative to the premisses, whereas the generalisations produced by ID3 and GOLEM remain speculative and conjectural, and are, at best, well-con rmed by data rather than rendered certain by the data. I have already at the end of the last section implicitly answered this objection. The rules of classical logic do indeed preserve certainty, but this is not essential for a logic. Thus PROLOG, when it uses negation-as-failure, gives up the preservation of certainty. Yet the certainty which PROLOG draws are very reasonable in many applications, and its rules do seem to have a broadly logical character. Given this, it hardly seems sensible to deny that the rules of inference used by ID3 or GOLEM have a logical character.
Conclusions
In this paper I have suggested the formula (based on the modi cation of a formula of Kowalski's): Logic = Inference + Control. This was used rst to explain the di-A Rapprochement Between Deductive and Inductive Logic 163 vergence between the elds of deductive and inductive logic which occurred during the period from Frege's Begri sschrift (1879) to the early 1970's. The claim was that deductive logic concentrated on rules of inference and ignored questions of control; while inductive logic concerned itself with devising measures of con rmation (part of control), while giving up as hopeless the task of formulating rules of inductive inference. Developments in arti cial intelligence from the early 1970's to the present have completely altered the situation. Logic programming (particularly PROLOG) has introduced control into deductive logic, while the study of machine learning has led to the formulation of rules of inductive inference. This is how the claimed rapprochement between deductive and inductive logic has occurred. The two elds are now beginning to look more similar than they have for many years. This is not to say of course that the two elds have completely merged. Even in the AI context, deduction looks very di erent from induction. The main di erence is perhaps this. While there are a whole variety of quite simple and straightforward rules of inference for deductive inference, the successful rules of inductive inference (such as those involved in ID3 or GOLEM) are relatively few in number, and complicated in character. Of course with the continuing study of machine learning this situation may change. Almost certainly more successful rules of inductive inference will be discovered, and their nature and interrelation will become clari ed.
There are also di erences between deductive and inductive logic on the control side. Control systems for inductive logic always involve con rmation measures, while the control system of e.g. PROLOG does not use the concept of con rmation. This di erence is, however, being eroded at this very moment, as can be seen in an interesting recent paper already mentioned (Cussens, Hunter and Srinivasan 1993]). As this paper has important philosophical consequences, I will conclude by brie y summarising its contents.
I have already described the machine learning program GOLEM. Now after GOLEM has generated some rules from the data, these are tested by deriving predictions, and seeing whether these predictions hold. This derivation is carried out using PROLOG. The idea of Cussens, Hunter and Srinivasan was to replace the logic used in these derivations (i.e. PROLOG) by other systems of non-monotonic logic to see whether better results could be obtained. The logics considered were prioritized logics formulated using Gabbay's method of labelled deductive systems. In these logics a consequence relation is de ned that allows the inference of the formula with the label that is most preferred according to some preference criterion. Since Cussens, Hunter and Srinivasan are considering rules generated by GOLEM, they are in a position to calculate the con rmation of these rules using various measures. These con rmation values can then be used as labels to determine the preference orderings of the particular prioritized logics employed (SF logics). Cussens, Hunter and Srinivasan are thus in a position to compare the derivations obtained using what could be called con rmation SF logics with those obtained using PROLOG. For the results of these comparisons, the reader is referred to their paper. Here I want to make two points of a philosophical character.
First of all PROLOG is here being compared with alternative logics which are deductive in character, but which use con rmation values as part of their control system. Thus the distinction between deductive and inductive logic is further eroded.
Secondly we have an instance of a philosophical idea, originally suggested by quite di erent considerations, receiving much stronger support from developments in AI. It was in fact the attempt to develop a special logic for quantum mechanics (quantum logic) which suggested the philosophical thesis that logic is empirical rather than a priori. The idea was that we choose not only the mathematics but also the logic which gives the best empirical results in a given domain, and that the logic appropriate to one domain might be di erent from that appropriate to another. Thus quantum logic might receive empirical support as a means of predicting and explaining results in the micro world, while classical logic was supported empirically in the macro world. This is how Quine formulates the idea in a famous passage ( 1951] , p. 43):
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what di erence is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?' Quantum logic has not, however, proved very successful in resolving the problem of quantum mechanics, and this has tended to discredit the view that logic might be empirical.
The AI developments just described suggest that the thesis should be revived, and give it strong support. In the experiments carried out by Cussens, Hunter and Srinivasan, a range of logics are compared in detail regarding their empirical success. The results of such testing could determine which logic is used in a particular context. All this surely indicates that logic is indeed empirical rather than a priori.
